A Close Presidential Race: What Does the Path Look Like for the US Post-Election?

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Key takeaways: In their first 100 days;

  • Trump likely to reduce power plant emission limits

  • Trump may revoke President Biden’s executive order on AI safety

  • Harris unlikely to deliver on $15 minimum wage campaign pledge

With less than a month before the election, the Swift Centre forecasters give a slight 58% edge to Vice President Kamala Harris, but it is still too close to call. In this article we focus on key promises and concerns, forecasting how each candidate will govern on the topics of defense treaties, lower wage workers (federal minimum wage and tax-free tips), AI security, and climate change (greenhouse gasses). Will their campaign rhetoric be transformed into results? Will our fears or aspirations be realized? 

Why Harris has the edge

https://viz.swiftcentre.org/results/JZu4_F0Ubyc/1728655199788?r2_url=https%3A%2F%2Fdata.swiftcentre.net&show=question

(hover/tap to see comments and rationales from forecasters within each range)  


Pro Harris:

Democrats have a distinct advantage in money, organization, and enthusiasm, though Trump has an extremely loyal and passionate base. Harris doesn't quite have the usual advantage of being an incumbent, but she hopes to escape full ownership of the negatives of the Biden administration's record while taking credit for its successes, in what seems to be a globally anti-incumbent year. 

The fact that abortion access is on the ballot in the swing states of Nevada and Arizona probably meaningfully increases the chance that she outperforms the polls in those states due to voter turnout. Approximately 75% of those in Nevada and Arizona are in favor of constitutional protections for abortion rights, with Harris leading Trump by double digits among women. Democrats outperformed the polls in the 2022 midterm elections primarily based on the reaction to the Supreme Court’s Dobbs decision, which overturned Roe vs. Wade, the US constitutional right to have an abortion.  This is likely to be enough to secure a victory in Nevada, where she currently leads by more than 1%. On the other hand Harris is currently down by over 1% in Arizona and both states are within the polling margin of error. North Carolina was a relatively safe state for Trump in 2020 but he is now in a tight race. Republican gubernatorial candidate Mark Johnson’s string of racist remarks on a porn site have tanked his chances. If that slightly suppresses Republican and centrist turnout, it could be enough for Harris to win the state.

A Swift forecaster has commented on the efficacy of campaign efforts;

“Debates don't usually matter much—[However] obviously they do sometimes! The debate between Harris and Trump was probably more meaningful than most since Trump did pretty badly.”

Another forecaster thinks;

“Harris has the edge, simply because she has better material to put people off of voting for Trump (January 6, abortion), but the average swing-state independent will think they'll be better off financially at the end of a Trump presidency than a Harris one, and that factor means the edge I give Harris is very slight.”

On the economy, another of our forecasters is “extremely skeptical that unemployment will hurt her, given that 4.1% is still fairly low by historical standards and the current US employment-population ratio is actually higher than it has been at any other time in the last 20 years.” Another aspect of the economy that could be a strength for Harris is that inflation is currently at 2.5%. This is still above the Federal Reserve’s target rate of 2% but cumulatively inflation is up 21.2% from when the Covid based recession began in February 2020. Although the US did better than the rest of the leading economies in the world, Reagan’s old adage; “are you better off than you were four years ago” doesn’t play well when people go to the grocery store, the pump, or try to buy a house and are shocked by the prices. 

Though Kamala Harris is maintaining a slight lead in national polling, a Swift forecaster recalls that historically, “a 2-2.5% lead in the national polling doesn't make for a Dem. electoral victory,” and is “concerned that there is, on average, a solid point or more of Dem. bias in national polling.” This is countered by the fact that “the voting population looks different from how it did in 2016, with more minority voters and an enthused female demographic exercised about abortion rights. These people could feasibly give Harris a victory far larger than current polling suggests.”

Pro Trump:

Trump and Vance will likely continue to make unforced errors, but these errors probably won't sway the election. Trump is awaiting sentencing on thirty-four felony convictions, lost a libel case for sexual assault that the judge stated fits the meaning of rape “as many people commonly understand the word ‘rape’,” and did not prevail on 62 cases brought to find fault with the 2020 election. In 2020 he lost the popular vote by more than 7 million people and the electoral college by 306 to 232, yet still fails to recognize that he lost the election. He incited a mob that stormed the Capital and for 187 minutes from the time they breached the police barricades, failed to tell them to stand down.  Any of these facts would likely have sunk any previous presidential candidate, but people are so numbed, partisan, or fearful of a Harris presidency, that it is unlikely another Trump scandal will change many votes. 

Others are motivated by their pro-life views, seeing Trump not as a holy man, but recognizing that he delivered for them on this key issue. Despite his own moral failings, he advocates for a return to “family, and Christian values” and so they imagine he will continue to deliver the policy changes they desire. 

Trump’s most persuasive argument was encapsulated by our forecaster’s insight that “the average swing-state independent will think they'll be better off financially at the end of a Trump presidency than a Harris one.” 

“Almost all voters know what they already think of him but, given the increase in his support from white voters, there appears to be a preference cascade that it is even more ok to support him than in 2016 or 2020. I think inflation that occurred under Biden is (rightly or wrongly) attributed to Biden and his administration, which obviously includes Harris. The stagnation in US-born employment will affect how native-born Americans will view the current economic situation and how it compares to under Trump. This, in combination with inflation, is a major concern for Harris, and she has little time to rectify the perception that many hold that things have gotten worse under Biden and herself.”

Another situation which may benefit Trump would be a conflagration between Israel and Iran which could result in attacks on oil infrastructure and shipping in the Persian Gulf. This would drive up the price at the pump in the US. An expansion of Israeli operations in Southern Lebanon will further alienate young voters and Muslims from Kamala Harris. 

 A forecaster giving Trump a 56% chance believes: 

“Harris still doesn't have a big enough cushion in the swing state polling to protect her from 2016 or 2020-sized polling errors. From what I've read pollsters may have got rid of 40-50% of their errors, but her leads still aren't large enough. Trump only needs to win Pennsylvania and Georgia and hold onto North Carolina. Add in some chicanery from the Trump camp on and after election day and I suspect that Harris is more likely than not to lose.”

It’s more likely under Trump, but the US is unlikely to withdraw from any defense treaties

https://viz.swiftcentre.org/results/JZu4_F0Ubyc/1728655477237?r2_url=https%3A%2F%2Fdata.swiftcentre.net&show=consequence&conditionals=46WfYm12r28

(hover/tap to see comments and rationales from forecasters within each range) 

The outcome will be based on the following treaties as reported by the US State Department’s official website

The US’ most prominent defense treaty is with NATO, and Trump’s criticism of European countries not paying the recommended 2% of their GDP towards defense (a concern not just shared by Trump but "normal" foreign relations experts and advisors) introduced some doubt as to whether he would unilaterally withdraw. In 2024, 23 of 32 member states met this goal. Trump has used the failure of some states to meet the 2% goal as a justification for why the US shouldn’t be as involved in helping Ukraine defend itself against Russia. 

There are bilateral treaties with the Philippines, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, and multilateral treaties with Australia and New Zealand, Southeast Asia, and the Rio Treaty which includes much of Central and South America, including Venezuela, where the US does not recognize Maduro as the winner of the last elections. . 

If Harris wins (2.5%): 

“It is difficult for me to imagine a Harris administration withdrawing from any of these treaties—has there been any suggestion outside of a Trump administration that the US would withdraw from any of them? But there are a lot of them and I'm leaving some small chance for unforeseen events to change US policy.”

The Democrats directly support defense alliances in their platform:

“Democrats believe America’s alliances are an irreplaceable cornerstone of our national security that should be cultivated, not cast away. Our allies offer an enormous strategic advantage that our rivals can’t match. They multiply our influence, spread our reach, lighten our burden, and advance our shared interests and priorities much farther than we could ever do on our own.”

A withdrawal from a collective defense treaty is “exceedingly unlikely under a Harris administration. Her convention speech (which was strongest on foreign policy from a rhetorical perspective) signaled that she will govern in line with the national security establishment, and if she wins it will be due to the votes of national security-oriented Republicans like former Vice-President Cheney.”

Possible exceptions are a “complete collapse and realignment in any of the countries listed, except for the Rio Treaty which includes Venezuela. I can imagine an attempt to remove Venezuela from the treaty based on the country not following any democratic norms, including with the results of the recent presidential election.”

If Trump wins (14%): 

“In the past, foreign policy hasn't changed much with new administrations. But Trump has specific plans to replace career civil servants with loyalists to make them more responsive to his edicts, so dramatic shifts in policy may be more possible under a Trump administration. As it is, he was able to withdraw from the recently negotiated JCPOA in his last term. I think Trump's lack of commitment to collective defense will weaken these treaties, but I think the most likely case is that Trump is convinced to stay in them in exchange for some concessions. But it's also possible he will think he stands to gain more from Russia or China by withdrawing from a collective defense treaty or it's worth it to him politically to make a point of withdrawing from one.”

“The choice of Vance over Burgum as his Vice-Presidential pick indicated that he wanted to govern no-holds-barred. Now, even though he won't have to worry about re-election in 2028, he'll instinctively know that he'll have to govern with the support of national security-oriented Republicans if he wants to leave a legacy for himself. However, the Administration will be staffed with people who are much more loyal to Trump and his foreign policy ideas than during his first Administration, so there will be fewer safeguards. On NATO specifically, Trump's team has talked about making 3% of GDP their new demand for NATO members' defence spending, which suggests that they're not actually looking to leave the alliance at the moment.”

The consensus among Swift forecasters is best summed up by this statement:

“Despite Trump's move towards isolationism, I think it is much more likely that he would significantly reduce spending and troop deployments to treaty countries as opposed to completely withdrawing from a treaty. The internal pushback to a withdrawal would be massive. I think it is more likely that he would withdraw from the Rio Treaty than fully withdraw from NATO.”


A $15 minimum wage is unlikely even if Harris wins

https://viz.swiftcentre.org/results/JZu4_F0Ubyc/1728655637275?r2_url=https%3A%2F%2Fdata.swiftcentre.net&show=consequence&conditionals=zmgJcQAuuZA

(hover/tap to see comments and rationales from forecasters within each range) 

If Harris wins (14%): 

“Democrats are unlikely to control both houses of Congress even if Harris is elected. They probably have less than a 30% chance of keeping control of the Senate. If they are able to keep control of the Senate, they won't be able to afford a single defection. The parliamentarian has previously found that they can't increase the minimum wage through reconciliation, which means they would have to get 60 votes to pass this over a filibuster. That means the only paths are 1) winning the Senate, eliminating the filibuster, and not have a single Democrat defect and 2) passing this as some kind of bipartisan bargain. It's a pretty tough road.”

A forecaster who was above the median (35%) stated “it's specifically mentioned in the Democratic platform, and [increasing minimum wage] would be a high priority. If Democrats have both Houses of Congress, this would be a lock. Unfortunately for Harris, there's only a 10% chance or so of that happening.” Another noted “…it's in the Democratic platform, so this question feels almost like a proxy on whether we think the Democrats will win the House/Senate (assuming that Harris wins the WH).” The path to the Democrats maintaining control of the Senate appears to go through John Tester of Montana, who is currently down in the polls by more than 6%, so might need a miracle. Forecasting miracles is not a sound model.

President Biden has already increased the minimum wage for federal employees to $15 per hour, with strong Democratic support. This shows intent, but convincing conservative and rural states to make a radical change will be tough from a business and ideological perspective. It goes against their philosophy that business and the markets work best when regulated the least. 

If Trump wins (3.8%): 

“I see no indication this is something Republicans would do. It's just barely possible to imagine a minimum wage hike going through a divided Congress as part of some kind of bipartisan deal, but it's hard to see Trump presiding over any congressional deal making either.”

“Republicans have traditionally opposed minimum wage increases.” This can be attributed both to being pro-business and to ideologically aligned with more decision making at the state level. “If it did go up, it would be more like $12 or so, which would align it with the previous increase when adjusted for inflation.”

Five states don't currently have a minimum wage but are bound by the federal minimum wage of $7.25/hr. Georgia and Wyoming's minimum wage is $7.25/hr. All of these states vote overwhelmingly Republican, decreasing the chance that Trump would want to go against them.

Will taxation on tips be eliminated under either president?

https://viz.swiftcentre.org/results/JZu4_F0Ubyc/1728655808596?r2_url=https%3A%2F%2Fdata.swiftcentre.net&show=consequence&conditionals=Rt_ZYjjtAZE

(hover/tap to see comments and rationales from forecasters within each range) 

If Harris wins (35%): 

Like with the minimum wage, “one issue is control of the House and Senate. A world where Kamala wins is likely one where they flip the House, but it's important to understand that Democrats have to run the table on several Senate races. If they lose even a single one, and Jon Tester in Montana will be the toughest one to hold, then they lose the Senate. Then it becomes a lot harder to get anything passed, even things with bipartisan support.” 

A forecaster notes that Harris supports eliminating taxes on tips and a technical solution may be when the “Trump tax cuts will expire in 2025 and I can see taxes on some tips being eliminated as part of a bipartisan tax deal.”

A skeptical forecaster “highly doubts this would be part of any bipartisan bill: such bills tend to result in better-than-average policy-making, and eliminating taxes on tips is a half-baked idea at best.” “The Build Back Better agenda was really pruned before it eventually passed, and eliminating taxes on tips might be considered too fiscally unwise.”

If Trump wins (47%): 

An argument against eliminating taxes in a Trump administration is that “this is a populist policy that Trump has embraced but he wouldn't be up for reelection, so the motivation may be reduced.” 

Cynical but insightful comments from one of our forecasters delves into the challenges of a split Congress: 

“The Republican Platform is short, with only 20 items on it, no tax on tips being one of them. A world where Trump wins is one where Republicans are almost certainly going to win either the Montana or Ohio Senate races, which means they flip the Senate and can get it done through budget reconciliation if they keep the House. The House will be a tougher proposition though, maybe 50/50 at best. So a lot will depend on that, since it's highly unlikely a Democratic House would want to give Trump that policy win.”

Regarding intent and ideology, a forecaster highlighted that this “certainly seems like something Trump wants to do and I'd expect the GOP to get it done (i.e. have Republicans ever missed an opportunity to lower/remove taxes?).”

Biden’s executive order on AI safety may be revoked by Trump

https://viz.swiftcentre.org/results/JZu4_F0Ubyc/1728655940466?r2_url=https%3A%2F%2Fdata.swiftcentre.net&show=consequence&conditionals=fr79sQtEQ0E

(hover/tap to see comments and rationales from forecasters within each range) 

If Harris wins (1.2%): 

Kamala Harris made a big push for AI safety (summit speech here and press call here) so my default assumption is that it's maybe a 1 in 50 chance that she would do a 180 on this.” It would also be unusual on partisanship grounds for Harris to reverse a Biden executive order, but if she “is serious about wanting to beat China in a race, maybe she'll turn to these kinds of actions. Also, the availability of compute (and amount of evidence on the safety of the current threshold) could change substantially over the next administration.” Her ties to San Francisco and Silicon Valley could possibly put pressure on her to prioritize rapid progress over safety, but not likely in the first 100 days.

If Trump wins (35%): 

Forecasters think there is “certainly a strong chance of this. It's in the GOP platform. If you look at Trump's track record, overturning his Democratic predecessor's EOs are what he likes to do (example with environmental EOs). The main issue is the timing, they may not get to it in just 100 days.”

“Revoking executive orders is in Trump's wheelhouse, though I don't think he's that accelerationist. He also seems to have the ear of AI companies' CEOs, and I think many of them want this executive order to stay; and he is aware of the risk of advanced AI (as demonstrated by the things he's said on his podcast appearances). If he does revoke it, I would expect him to put in place a successor piece of legislation in place, which would probably be looser; I don't think he'll do this in his first 100 days back in the White House, however, as I it's unlikely to be a priority of his.”

An obscure reason why Trump may want to revoke Biden’s Executive Order is the section about discrimination in housing. It is likely to bother Trump, considering that he and his father were sued by the Justice Department in 1973. The Trump's settlement included a statement that they "failed and neglected" to comply with the Fair Housing Act. Whether it is a priority in the first 100 days is another issue.

Limits on power plants’ greenhouse gas emissions depends strongly on the election outcome

https://viz.swiftcentre.org/results/JZu4_F0Ubyc/1728656211763?r2_url=https%3A%2F%2Fdata.swiftcentre.net&show=consequence&conditionals=N8mA_A_LxEA

(hover/tap to see comments and rationales from forecasters within each range) 

If Harris wins (19%): 

“I think that Harris is far more likely to want to meet the growing load demand with variable renewables. Still, in some places (NY) these are surprisingly difficult to add to the grid (despite the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act aiming to reduce carbon emissions by 45% by 2030 and 85% by 2050 compared to 1990 levels and ambitions to generate 70% of its electricity from carbon-free sources by 2030 and achieve 100% carbon-free electricity by 2040) virtually no variable wind has been added. The potential for variable solar energy is limited in the northeast of the US. In other places (TX, CA), large amounts have been added with considerable costs (directly and indirectly), making me think that even with the climate ambitions, Harris has the potential to water these rules down, especially with a Republican Senate.”

An issue to watch for is that the Harris Administration itself is unlikely to revoke the Greenhouse Gas Rule, but as the law firm Vinson & Elkins point out, the US has "a highly conservative court system, and there are a lot of hats to hang an argument on if the Supreme Court or DC Circuit want to eventually revoke it, as happened with the Obama Administration's Clean Power Plan.” 

It is unlikely that Harris would weaken the rules unless there is a crisis.

If Trump wins (84%):

Trump rolled back a lot of environmental regulations in his first term. I would expect him to do the same in his second.”

“Technically one could say the Clean Power Plan almost survived the Trump Administration. Trump did things like defund it as soon as he could, but as far as I can tell from reading the Wikipedia entry, it was a process that took 2 years (2017-2019) to revoke it and replace it with decidedly less-strict rules. But then there were further legal challenges until the Supreme Court killed it with the West Virginia v. EPA decision on June 30, 2022.”

“Taking a quick peek at the EPA Administrators in the Trump Administration (2016-2020) -- Scott Pruitt, noted climate change denier, and Andrew Wheeler, who is a critic on the limits of greenhouse gas emissions -- it's hard to imagine this rule surviving to the end of the second Trump Presidency.”

Conclusions

Of the areas that Swift Centre forecasters addressed, climate change and AI safety are where the greatest differences emerged between what the candidates are likely to implement if they become President. The usual challenges of changing legislation, even on bipartisan issues, make substantial legislative changes unlikely. 

https://viz.swiftcentre.org/results/JZu4_F0Ubyc/1728656256599?r2_url=https%3A%2F%2Fdata.swiftcentre.net

(hover/tap to see comments and rationales from forecasters within each range) 

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